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DeFUNIS v. ODEGAARD:
PREFERENTIAL LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS
FOR RACIAL MINORITIES
A[n] ...objection that has been made to preferential admis-
sion standards is that the use of race or ethnicity as a factor in
admissions decisions violates the Constitution. The courts have
not yet been squarely faced with this claim, and in dealing with it
we are therefore forced to proceed by analogy, piecing together
decisions which have skirted the periphery of this sensitive and
complex issue.,
In DeFunis v. Odegaard the Supreme Court of Washington has
provided American jurisprudence with its first excursion into the
difficult constitutional area of preferential admission standards. Plain-
tiff, an unsuccessful applicant to the University of Washington School
of Law, challenged the constitutionality of the policy and procedure
that resulted in his being denied admission.
The University's express policy was to increase representation of
disadvantaged racial minorities in the law school and the legal profes-
sion. To further this policy, the admissions committee adopted a
"preferential" program for minorities that considered an applicant's
racial background as one factor in the selection of students.3 A "pre-
dicted first-year average" was computed for all applicants on the basis
of college grades and Law School Admissions Test scores. The averages
of minority applicants, however, were not directly compared with
those of non-minority applicants. In a separate evaluation the ad-
missions committee undertook to identify the minority applicants
most likely to succeed in law school. As a result of this process, a
1. O'Neil, PerferentlI [sic] Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority
Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 705-06 (1971).
2. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated per curiam as moot, 94
S. Ct. 1704 (1974). The United States Supreme Court's treatment of the case
on certiorari is discussed in the Epilogue infra.
3. Policies granting preferential treatment to minority groups are commonly
called "affirmative action" programs. The origins and nature of these programs
have been discussed in Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial
Preferences in Law Admissions-DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. REv. 1-7(1973) (hereinafter cited as Morris].
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number of minority applicants were admitted with predicted first-year
averages lower than plaintiff's.4 Based upon these facts, plaintiff
maintained, inter alia,5 that his denial of admission violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
of Washington held that the University's consideration of race as
a factor in its admissions policy was not unconstitutional.0
The threshold issue raised in DeFunis is whether racial classifica-
tions are per se unconstitutional; that is, whether the equal protec-
tion clause mandates "color-blindness." Although the per se rule has
been advocated by individual members of the United States Supreme
Court in various contexts, it has never been expressly adopted by
a majority.7 Limited support for this position may be found in Brown
v. Board of Educations and in subsequent per curiam decisions in-
validating racial classifications. 9 While the Brown opinion focused
heavily on the "inherent inequality" of segregated school systems, per
curiam decisions of the Court have relied on Brown to invalidate
4. The predicted first-year average was not the sole criterion employed by the
admissions committee. Nonetheless, the trial court found that plaintiff was "better
qualified" than many of the minority applicants admitted, and this finding does
not appear to have been challenged by the University on appeal. 82 Wash. 2d at
..... ., 507 P.2d at 1176-77.
5. Plaintiff also raised two secondary arguments. First, he maintained that the
law school's consideration of race and deviation from the numerical ranking of
applicants constituted arbitrary and capricious administrative action. The court
ruled that plaintiff had failed to carry his burden of proof on this issue. Id. at
......, 507 P.2d at 1185-87. Secondly, plaintiff argued that the University was
required to give preference to Washington residents over non-residents. This argu-
ment was based on article 9, section 1 of the state constitution, regarding the
duty of the state to provide education for resident children, and on certain statu-
tory provisions that differentiated between residents and non-residents for various
purposes including the receipt of state aid. The court held that article 9 did not
apply to the University of Washington and that the statutes did not require that
preference be given to state residents with regard to admission. Id. at .......
507 P.2d at 1187-88.
6. Id. at ..... , 507 P.2d at 1184-85.
7. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(state anti-miscegenation statute); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198
(1964) (Stewart & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (state anti-interracial cohabitation
statute); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 566 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (alleged discriminatory administration of state pilotage
laws); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (state
statute requiring "equal but separate accommodations" for white and black rail-
way passengers).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), order entered, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).




segregated public parks,10 golf courses,1' courtrooms, 12 buses," and
beaches 14 in cases containing little evidence of inherent inequality.
Many commentators, however, suggest that these cases merely pro-
hibit de jure segregation of the races with regard to public facilities
and are not dispositive of cases involving purposeful integration by
racial classification.15 Lower court decisions, moreover, have con-
sistently rejected the notion that racial classifications are per se im-
permissible. Racially-conscious programs have been permitted when
there is a constitutional obligation to eliminate de jure segregation. 6
In North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann'7 the Supreme
Court invalidated a state statute proscribing school bussing assign-
ments made on the basis of race. The Court stated: "Just as the race
of students must be considered in determining whether a constitu-
tional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formu-
lating a remedy." s
The question remains whether racial classifications are permissible
as part of a voluntary program to eliminate racial imbalance. Al-
though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue,' 9 lower courts
have allowed school boards considerable discretion in establishing
voluntary programs employing racial classifications to eliminate de
10. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, aff'g
per curiam 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958).
11. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93
3th Cir. 1955).
12. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
13. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, aff'g per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.
Ala. 1956).
14. Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, aff'g per curiam 220 F.2d
3L;6 (4th Cir. 1955).
15. See L. HAND, TnE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Vieira, Racial Imbal-
ance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MIC. L. REv.
1553 (1969); cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. Ruv. 1, 32 (1959).
16. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (1966), afl'd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
17. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
18. Id. at 46.
19. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971).
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facto school segregation.20 No federal court of appeals or highest
state court has applied the per se rule to invalidate governmental
efforts to reduce racial imbalance in the schools.21
A significant distinction between school desegregation cases and the
problem of preferential admissions must not be overlooked. The ob-
ject of school integration is simply to provide all individuals with an
equal educational opportunity, and thus "the use of the racial classi-
fication... impose[s] no constitutionally cognizable detriment upon
any person because of his or another's race." 22 Preferential admis-
sions, however, given the inability of institutions of higher education
to enroll all applicants, dearly impose a detriment-the denial of ad-
mission.2
3
Yet, recent cases indicate that the imposition of a detriment is
not determinative. Policies that favor minorities have been upheld
even when they have deprived non-minorities of benefits. In Porcelli
v. Titus,24 for example, a school board suspended the ordinary
teacher promotion schedule in order to give priority to black candi-
dates. Sustaining this action, the Third Circuit concluded: "State
action based partly on considerations of color, when color is not used
per se, and in furtherance of a proper governmental objective, is not
necessarily a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment., 25 Similarly,
in Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee2 6 the Supreme Court upheld Congress'
use of a racial classification to establish preferential inheritance rights
for certain American Indians, notwithstanding the obvious imposition
20. E.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 248 F. Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1965), afl'd,
378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Fuller v. Volk, 230 F. Supp. 25 (D.N.J. 1964),
vacated on other grounds, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965), adhered to on the merits,
250 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.J. 1966); Guida v. Board of Educ., 26 Conn. Supp. 121,
213 A.2d 843 (Super. Ct. 1965); Strippoli v. Bickal, 16 N.Y.2d 652, 209 N.E.2d
123, 261 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1965); Addabbo v. Donovan, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 209 N.E.2d
112, 261 N.Y.S.2d 68, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965); Van Blerkom v. Dono-
van, 15 N.Y.2d 399, 207 N.E.2d 503, 259 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin,
14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881
(1964).
21. P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HoW, & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1140 (3d ed. 1967).
22. Morris 6-7.
23. Id. at 7.
24. 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
25. 431 F.2d at 1257.





of a detriment upon other individuals.2 7 Given these and other cases
acknowledging the use of racial classifications, 28 the DeFunis court's
rejection of the per se rule would appear to be well supported by the
judicial decisions most directly in point.
Once a court finds that a racial classification is not per se unconsti-
tutional, as did the DeFunis court, the question still remains by what
equal protection standard the constitutionality of the racial classifi-
cation should be measured. The preponderance of case law indicates
that racial classifications are "suspect" and must withstand a "very
heavy burden of justification." 29 This strict standard of review im-
poses upon the state the burden of demonstrating two elements. First,
the state must show that a legitimate and important state interest is
served by the classificationaO This requisite state interest is often de-
scribed as "overriding" or "compelling," particularly when racial
classifications are involved.3 1 Secondly, the state must show a high
degree of relevance between the suspect classification and the state
interest. When racial and other suspect classifications are involved,
a mere rational relationship between the classification and the state
interest is deemed insufficient to satisfy the strict standard of review. 2
Rather, the state must demonstrate that the racial classification is a
"necessary" means of implementing the governmental purpose, i.e.,
that feasible non-racial alternatives are not available. 33
Several commentators have questioned the application of the strict
standard of review to racial classifications designed to redress the
27. 244 F. Supp. at 815. The federal statute provides that "only enrolled
members of the Yaldima Tribes of one-fourth or more blood of such tribes shall
take by inheritance or by will any interest in . . . [the] estate of a deceased
member of such tribes . . ." and thus works to the detriment of all other natural
heirs. Act of August 9, 1946, ch. 933, § 7, 60 Stat. 969, as amended, 25 U.S.c.
§ 607 (1970) (emphasis added).
28. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971) Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971); Haem v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va.) (three-judge court), aff'd
sub nom. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).
29. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967); see McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
30. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. Rmv. 1065, 1087-
1104 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
31. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
32. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
33. Developments in the Law 1101-02.
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effects of past discrimination.34 One alternative is to subject "benign"
racial classifications to a less rigid standard of review, perhaps even
the more permissive "rational relationship ' test normally applied to
economic regulations.35 Convincing arguments have been made on
both sides of this issue. It has been noted that the less stringent ra-
tional relationship test would permit greater governmental flexibility
in formulating remedial programs for minorities.8 Moreover, the
traditional rationales for applying the strict standard arguably do
not apply when racial classifications are designed to benefit disad-
vantaged minorities.37 Those opposed to a permissive standard of
review maintain that racial classifications call for strict judicial scrutiny
because they offend traditional notions of individualism, weaken the
government as an educative force, and are inherently divisive. 8 The
stricter standard would also require the courts to determine whether
a particular use of a racial classification was truly benign,,-an inquiry
that becomes especially problematic when the classification works
to the detriment of certain persons, as do preferential admissions.10
An examination of pertinent case law does not reveal by what
standard ostensibly benign racial classifications should be measured.
Courts that have dealt with voluntary programs to end de facto school
segregation have not clearly articulated an applicable standard of
review. 41 Even when the language of their opinions indicates applica-
tion of the strict standard of review, courts have not required the
state to demonstrate the absence of non-racial alternatives. 42 Instead,
34. See Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Con-
cepts, 78 HAv. L. Rav. 564 (1965); Kaplan, Equal justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv.
363 (1966); Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960);
O'Neil, supra note 1.
35. See Developments in the Law 1108.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1107-08.
38. Kaplan, supra note 34, at 375-79.
39. Developments in the Law 1114.
40. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
41. Developments in the Law 1108; see, e.g., Tometz v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill.
2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693,
227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Booker v. Board
of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199
N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Booker v.
Board of Edue., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d




benign racial classifications have been readily accepted as necessary
to the governmental objective of eliminating racial imbalance.43
Thus, the remedial purpose of state action may affect the degree of
judicial scrutiny,4" and past decisions do not foreclose the possibility
of applying the more permissive rational relationship test to benign
racial classifications. For this reason, one writer concluded that "the
choice between the different standards of review may well be the
critical factor in the decision of the constitutionality of some meas-
ures involving benign racial classifications." 45
In DeFunis, however, the court's application of the strict standard
of review did not prove fatal to the University's admissions policy.
The court found that the policy of considering race as a factor in a
preferential admissions program for minority students met both ele-
ments of the strict standard-the compelling state interest and the req-
uisite high degree of relevance. The University's objective was to
remedy underrepresentation of racial minorities in the law school
and the legal profession. The court found that this objective met
the state interest requirement of the strict scrutiny tesL46 In de
facto school segregation cases, courts have consistently upheld vol-
untary policies designed to ameliorate racial inequality.47 A few
months before DeFunis, the Supreme Court of Washington acknowl-
edged the state interest in voluntary programs of bussing school chil-
dren in order to eliminate racial imbalance in public schools. 48 Courts
have also recognized, at least implicitly, the important state interest
served by racially-conscious corrective programs in other contexts-
most notably grand jury selection,49 urban renewal relocation,5 0 and
governmental hiring of minorities.5 ' Furthermore, numerous reports
and individual commentators have testified to the severe underrepre-
43. Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1967).
44. See generally McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802
(1969); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
45. Developments in the Law 1107.
46. See text at note 30 supra.
47. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
48. State ex rel. Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 492 P.2d 536 (1972).
49. Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
50. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968).
51. Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
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sentation of minorities in law schools and the legal profession and to
the urgent need for government to undertake remedial programs5 2
Finally, the DeFunis court noted that racial balance in law schools
would facilitate the state's educational interest in ensuring that
,"lawyers ... be cognizant of the views, needs and demands of all seg-
ments of society."53
The court's opinion seems least persuasive in its examination of the
requisite high degree of relevance between .the University's considera-
tion of race and its objective.4 Applying the strict standard of review,
,the court required that the use of race as a factor in admissions be
"necessary" to the University's objective and inquired, albeit briefly,
into possible non-racial alternatives. 5 In arguing that the minority
admissions policy did meet the test of necessity, the court relied on
Brown v. Board of Education56 and on ,the statement in Green v.
County School Board-7 calling for a remedial plan that "promises
realistically to work now."6 8 These cases established the affirmative
constitutional duty to eradicate de jure segregation, and, therefore,
their relevance to voluntary actions, such as preferential admissions
for minorities, is limited.
The DeFunis court's conclusion that "[no less restrictive means
would serve the governmental interest here"' 9 does find some support
in secondary material. After examining alternatives such as greater
reliance on black colleges, expansion of junior colleges, use of "open"
admissions, and preferential treatment based on general disadvantage,
one commentator reached the conclusion that "there is no effective
,substitute for the explicit use of race as a preferential criterion for
most colleges and universities."60
52. REPORT OF BLACK LAWYERS AND JUDGEs IN THE U.S., 1960-70, 116 CONG.
REc. 30786 (1970); Edwards, A New Role for the Black Law Graduate-A Re-
ality or an Illusion?, 69 Mscu. L. REv. 1407 (1971); Gellhorn, The Law Schools
and the Negro, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1069; Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Educa-
tion: Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Traditional
Criteria, 1970 U. TOL. L. REv. 321.
53. 82 Wash. 2d at ....... 507 P.2d at 1183.
For the suggestion that preservation of the public peace constitutes another
compelling state interest in the DeFunis context see Morris 42-44.
54. See text following note 31 supra.
55. 82 Wash. 2d at ......, 507 P.2d at 1184.
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), order entered, 349 U.S. 249 (1955).
57. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
58. Id. at 439.
59. 82 Wash. 2d at ...... 507 P.2d at 1184.




Authority to the contrary, however, is equally abundant.6l It is
argued, for example, that remedial action based directly on prior dis-
advantage would effectively correct racial imbalance without the
inherent divisiveness of racial classifications.62 Greater effort in recruit-
ment and financial aid is also proposed as an alternative to prefer-
ential minority admissions.63 Because of this sharp disagreement
among authorities and the lack of relevant judicial precedent, the
issue of non-racial alternatives may have warranted greater attention
and exposition by the DeFunis court.64
In summary, the Washington supreme court's resolution of DeFunis
was complicated by three factors. First, DeFunis is the first judicial
encounter with a state university's use of an admissions policy based
in part on racial factors. Secondly, prior to DeFunis, courts had not
clearly articulated the equal protection standard to be used in reviev-
ing purportedly benign racial classifications. Thirdly, the court faced
the difficult task of achieving a sensitive balance between the need
for governmental flexibility in formulating racially remedial policies
and the creation of a constitutional doctrine that is not susceptible to
abuse.65
61. For an extensive discussion and evaluation of various law school admissions
policies see Symposium, 1970 U. TOL. L. Ryv. 277.
62. See Vieira, supra note 15, at 1617.
63. Cf. Graglia, Special Admission of the "Culturally Deprived" to Law School,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 351, 353 (1970).
64. Consider, however, one writer's suggestion that the factual record before
the DeFunis trial court was insufficient for a full evaluation of alternative meas-
ures. 52 B.U.L. REV. 304, 308 (1972).
Another writer has asserted that the Washington supreme court's opinion was
deficient with respect to a related issue-whether the law school's definition of
the minority group members entitled to its admissions preference was constitution-
ally sufficient. Morris 47-51. A definition of a class that does not encompass those
members who are "similarly situated," i.e., that is under- or over-inclusive, ordi-
narily will not be permitted under the strict standard of review. F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d
718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Pro-
tection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949). The law school limited its
admissions preference to certain designated minority groups. It provided no cri-
teria for determining whether an individual qualified as a member of one of the
groups, and applicants were simply allowed to categorize themselves. 82 Wash.
2d at ......, 507 P.2d at 1173-74. The DeFunis court specifically found: "In
light of the purpose of the minority admissions policy, the racial classification need
not include all racial minority groups." Id. at ......, 507 P.2d at 1184. Yet, the
court did not address itself to the lack of criteria for ascertaining minority group
membership.
65. Vieira, supra note 15, at 1617.
1974]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In light of these factors, the DeFunis court's clear articulation of
an applicable standard is by itself of considerable value. Further,
the court's decision produces a reasonable compromise between con-
flicting concerns: it allows the state a certain degree of freedom to
initiate voluntary plans designed to remedy severe racial imbalance
in state schools, and, at the same time, the court's application of the
strict standard of review guards against governmental abuse of racial
classifications in the effort to achieve racial balance.
In two respects, however, the DeFunis court's development of equal
protection doctrine warrants cautious consideration. Courts have
been imprecise in articulating and lax in applying the strict stand-
ard of review to purportedly benign racial classifications.06 The
danger therefore exists that the strict standard may become merely
a nominal legal doctrine with its efficacy impaired when applied
to the challenge of non-benign racial classifications. At the other
extreme, vigorous application of the strict standard might seriously
undermine governmental attempts to rectify past deprivation based
on race. If either of these developments occurs, the options of apply-
ing the less stringent standard of review or of formulating a special
intermediate standard for racially-conscious remedial programs should
be seriously considered.*
Michael B. Huston
66. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
*EPILOGUx
In November 1973 the United States Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition
for a writ of certiorari. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973). Five
months later the Court rendered a per curiam opinion holding that the case was
moot and vacating the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington. DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974). Plaintiff had been admitted to the law
school in accordance with the trial court's decree and had remained enrolled
by virtue of a stay of the Washington supreme court's judgment. Thus, as the
case came before the United States Supreme Court, plaintiff was enrolled for the
final quarter of his law school career, and evidence in the record indicated that
he would be permitted to graduate regardless of the outcome of the appeal. Id.
at 1704-06. On these grounds, the Court concluded that it could not, "consistently
with the limitations of Article III of the Constitution, consider the substantive
constitutional issues tendered by the parties." Id. at 1707.
Four members of the Court dissented. In an opinion joined by Justices Douglas,
White and Marshall, Justice Brennan considered applicable the principle that
"[m]ere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case,"
Id. at 1721, quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968), and therefore objected to "the Court's straining to rid
itself of this dispute." 94 S. Ct. at 1722.
[Vol. 8:311
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Only Justice Douglas, in a separate dissenting opinion, discussed the merits of
the case. He strongly emphasized the conclusion that state law school applications
must be considered "in a racially neutral way." Id. at 1714, 1716. Thus, Justice
Douglas would not permit admissions preference to be accorded solely on the basis
of race. Id. at 1713. Yet he would condone an admissions policy that took into
account disparate cultural backgrounds as well as possible biases in undergraduate
records and the Law School Admission Test. Id.
The legal rationale by which Justice Douglas reached this conclusion is some-
what difficult to discern. As this Comment has indicated, racial classifications
may be held unconstitutional on several grounds: that they are per se impermis-
sible, that the state did not establish a compelling interest, or that non-racial
alternatives were available. Apparently, Justice Douglas considers no state interest
sufficiently important to justify differences in racial treatment when mental ability
and professional competition are involved. He stated: "So far as race is con-
cerned, any state sponsored preference to one race over another in that competi-
tion is in my view 'invidious' and violative of the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 1719. This language may suggest that Justice Douglas embraces the theory
that racial classifications are per se impermissible in most contexts. As examples
of the few contexts in which racial discrimination might be justified, Justice
Douglas noted "racial strains, racial susceptibility to certain diseases, [and] racial
sensitiveness to environmental conditions that other races do not experience ......
Id.
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